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Abstract: This article reviews some of the theoretical notions and empirical phenomena
which figure in current formal-semantic theories of focus. It also develops the connection
between “alternative semantics” and “givenness” accounts of focus interpretation.
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1. Introduction
The contemporary theoretical term focus originates in Halliday (1967),
who said that the capitalized phrases in sentences (1)–(4) have a gram-
matical property which he called information focus.
(1) (Who painted the shed yesterday?)
John painted the shed yesterday.
(2) (When did John paint the shed?)
John painted the shed yesterday.
(3) Mary always goes to town on Saturdays.
(4) Mary always goes to town on Saturdays.
In cases such as (1)–(2), the location of focus is conditioned by how
the sentence containing the focus fits into its context, here the question.
1216–8076/$ 20.00 © 2008 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
278 MATS ROOTH
The examples illustrate that if the questioned element is changed, the
locus of focus changes in parallel. Strikingly, in other cases focus has a
truth-conditional semantic effect. If last year, Mary went to town on a
Wednesday half a dozen times, then (4) is false (as a generalization about
this time period) but (3) may be true. If on half a dozen Saturdays she
took a walk in the woods and avoided town, then (3) is false, but (4)
may still be true.
2. Grammatical representation of focus
Focus is a grammatical property which has a phonology (some kind of
prominence) and a semantics and/or pragmatics (a topic which will be
discussed later). In this respect, it is like content words or features such
as tense, which also have an influence on both sides of the form/meaning
correspondence. To link the two, it is usually assumed that focus is
represented syntactically, by means of a syntactic feature or other piece
of syntactic representation. This move was made by Jackendoff (1972),
who introduced a syntactic feature which is written F. The F feature
marks the focused phrase, and a phrase which is not marked with F is
unfocused. Thus the focus feature is simply a binary-valued syntactic
feature. (5) and (6) correspond to (1) and (2).
(5) [S[NPJohn]F [VP[VPpainted [NPthe shed]] [NPyesterday]]]
(6) [S[NPJohn] [VP[VPpainted [NPthe shed]] [NPyesterday]F]]
The point of the F feature is to link the phonology of focus with the se-
mantics and pragmatics of focus. This is done with independent phono-
logical and semantic principles which refer to the F feature. (7) is the
phonological principle from Jackendoff (1972). It says that F corresponds
to stress prominence in a certain domain. Jackendoff’s semantic princi-
ple was (8). It generates a semantic object which has variables in the
position of focus phrases. The Presupposition corresponding to (5) is an
open proposition ‘y painted the shed yesterday’, with a variable y in the
position of the focused phrase.
(7) If a phrase P is chosen as the focus of a sentence S, the highest stress in S will
be on the syllable of P that is assigned highest stress by the regular stress rules.
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(8) The semantic material associated with surface structure nodes dominated by F is
the Focus of the sentence. To derive the Presupposition, substitute appropriate
semantic variables for the focused material.
To avoid confusion with the standard notion of presupposition in natural
language semantics, it is better to substitute another technical term for
Jackendoff’s Presupposition. Let’s call this semantic object which has
variables substituted for focused phrases the focus skeleton. As we will
see, the focus skeleton is closely related to the constructs used in current
semantic accounts of focus. A rough idea is that the focus skeleton func-
tions as a schema which is matched to the discourse context, and which
is referred to in the semantics of certain constructions.
3. Breadth of focus
The F feature resolves representationally the question of what phrase or
phrases are focused. In a given syntactic tree, the focused phrases are the
phrases which bear the F feature. A focus on a relatively small phrase,
such as a phrase with a single word as a terminal string, is said to be a
“narrow” focus. (9) gives examples of narrow focus in a question context.
(a)(9) (What did Mary do to Fluffy?)
She fedF Fluffy.
(b) (What cats did Mary feed?)
She fed FluffyF.
A focus on a relatively large phrase such as verb phrase containing several
words is said to be a broad focus or wide focus. The terminology is
natural, because the interval of words fed Fluffy is broader (or wider)
then the interval of words fed and the interval of words Fluffy. (10)
illustrates broad focus on VP in a question context.
(10) (What did Mary do when she got home?)
She [fed Fluffy]F.
In both (9b) and (10) the principal prominence falls on the first syllable
of Fluffy, as is predicted by the phonological constraint (7). Jackendoff
(1972) put forth the hypothesis that, fixing a phonological representation
which has sentence stress on the first syllable of Fluffy in she fed Fluffy,
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syntactic F-marking could be either on the object [Fluffy], the VP [fed
Fluffy], or indeed the entire sentence [she fed Fluffy]. So on this hypoth-
esis, the breadth of focus is often ambiguous, if one pays attention only
to a phonological representation.
However, breadth of focus can be constrained by phonological phras-
ing. In the narrow-focus example (11), it seems the major phrase break
can follow either the subject Magdalena, or the verb fed.
(11) Which cats did your sister Magdalena feed?
(Magdalena )( fed Fluffy)
(Magdalena fed )( Fluffy)
If we switch focus to the VP as in (12), it seems that the pronunciation
with the major phrase break after fed is impossible.
(12) What did your sister Magdalena do when she got home?
??(Magdalena fed )( Fluffy)
(Magdalena )( fed Fluffy )
Selkirk (1984) introduced the hypothesis that F marking in examples like
(10) is nested. Both verb fed and the nominal Fluffy are novel in the
discourse, the reasoning goes, and so they are marked with F’s. The
correct representation for (10) on this account is (13).
(13) (What did Mary do when she got home?)
She [fedF FluffyF]F
4. Scope of focus
The phonological constraint (7) refers not just to a focus, but to the
notion of a phrase being the focus of a sentence. Assuming that there
is a focus on John in example (14), is John the focus of the embedded
sentence [John was at the party], or of the containing sentence [that John
was at the party is certain]? Just locating an F feature on John as in
(15) does not resolve the question.
(14) Who was at the party?
That John was at the party // is certain.
(15) That JohnF was at the party is certain.
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On phonological grounds, one can argue that the sentence S referred to
in the constraint (7) must be the embedded sentence in this case. While
John is more prominent than anything else in the embedded sentence,
it is probably not more prominent than certain. Truckenbrodt (1995)
discussed data like (16) where according to an analysis of Rooth (1992),
there are F-features on American and Canadian. Truckenbrodt pointed
out that while American is more prominent than farmer, arguably the
most prominent syllable in the sentence as whole is joke. So if we want to
maintain the constraint (7), we cannot say that American is the focus of
the whole sentence in (15), because that would require that American has
highest stress prominence in the whole sentence. Note that in this case,
there is no embedded sentence, so there is no choice of S for which the
constraint (7) is observed. Truckenbrodt called the stretch of phonological
material within which a focus is maximally prominent the domain of the
focus, and suggested that the domain of the focus on American is an
American farmer or American farmer.
(16) An AmericanF farmer told a CanadianF farmer a joke.
There is also a semantic side to this argument. (17a) is the focus skeleton
obtained from the embedded sentence in (15). It can be matched to the
question context by matching the variable y to the wh-phrase. (We will
see later how this matching process can be formalized.) On the other
hand, (17b) is the focus skeleton obtained using the matrix sentence.
This does not match the question context. So also on semantic grounds,
there is reason to think that John is the focus of the embedded sentence.
(a)(17) Focus skeleton for embedded sentence in (14)
‘y was at the party’
(b) Focus skeleton for matrix sentence in (14)
‘that y was at the party is certain’
The dimension of variation which is illustrated in (17) is called the scope
of focus. In (16), the scope of the focus on American is the contain-
ing nominal [American farmer] or [an American farmer], not the whole
sentence. And in (14), the scope of the focus on John is the embedded
sentence, not the matrix.
While the notion of scope is in fact implicit in both the phonological
constraint (7) and the semantic constraint (8), a syntactic representa-
tion of scope does not follow immediately from postulating an F feature.
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Rooth (1992) proposed that the scope of an F is fixed by a “focus inter-
pretation” operator ∼ k, which also specifies an antecedent k for the focus
skeleton. Chomsky (1971) suggested that the scope of focus is marked
representationally by covert movement.
Schwarzschild (1999) made a more parsimonious proposal: in trees
with nested configurations of F marking, one F delimits the scope of
another. A representation for (15) where the scope of the focus on John
is the embedded clause is (18). Effectively, the maximal scope of an F on
a node a is the maximal phrase b which dominates a and is not F-marked.
Since in (18) the embedded that-clause is F-marked but the embedded S
is not, the scope is the embedded S.
(18) [[That [JohnF was at the party]]F [isF certainF]F]
5. Focus anaphoricity
Focus anaphoricity is the hypothesis that the semantics and pragmatics of
focus involves a relation to context which is a kind of anaphora. Suppose
we put (18) back into its context, and add an index which indicates
that the “antecedent” for the focus on John is the question. Then we
arrive at something along the lines of (19), which gives one option using
the representation where the scope of F is delimited by F, and another
option where the scope is delimited by ∼.
(19) [Who was at the party]6
[[That [JohnF6 was at the party]]F [isF certainF]F]
[[That [JohnF was at the party]∼ 6] [is certain]]
The rough idea is that the focus (or the focus interpretation operator)
is allowed to be coindexed with the question (and thus to be licensed
by it) because the focus skeleton (17a) matches the question. A couple
of descriptive classes of matching can be identified. Sometimes the an-
tecedent looks like the scope of the focus, but with something else of the
same type substituted for the focused phrase. (20) is an example, where
John in the antecedent substitutes for the F-marked Mary. Call this a
substitution focus.
(20) [John wrote the report]4.
[No, [MaryF4 wrote it]]F.
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Rooth (1992) analyzed configurations where the antecedent is a set of
propositions. This includes the question configuration as in (19), on the
hypothesis that the semantic value of a question is a set of propositions.
In some cases the set of propositions is implicit in a discourse represen-
tation. The pragmatic logic of the scalar quantity implicature example
(21) refers to a set of alternative assertions, such as the assertion that
Paul passed and the assertion that Steve passed, where Steve and Paul
are two of the speaker’s co-students. The index 2 can be taken to be the
referential index of this set of propositions.
(21) How did the exam go?
[Well [IF2 passed]]F
An F whose antecedent is a set of propositions is called an alternative-
set focus. Another class of antecedents have an existentially quantified
phrase replacing the focus in the antecedent. (22) is an example.
(22) [Mary spoke to someone about his problems]8
[Yeah, [she spoke to JohnF8 about his problems]]F
6. Focus interpretation
Formal-semantic developments of focus anaphoricity state conditions on
what can be an antecedent for a focus. For instance, we want to rule
out the representation (23), which has an inappropriate correspondence
between question and answer.
(23) [Who painted the shed yesterday]2
[John painted the shed [yesterday]F2]
Rooth (1992) stated a constraint covering alternative-set focus which
works as follows. One first generates a set X of propositions by making
all possible substitutions for the variables in the focus skeleton. This
object is called a focus semantic value. The constraint on the antecedent
is that it be a subset of X containing the ordinary semantic value of
the focused phrase and something else. In the answer of (23), the focus
skeleton has a variable in the position of yesterday, so the set X con-
tains propositions like ‘John painted the shed on Nov. 19th, 2006’, ‘John
painted the shed on Nov. 20th, 2006’, ‘John painted the shed in 2005’,
and so forth, with various choices for the frame time adverb substituting
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for yesterday. The antecedent question, on a theory where questions de-
note sets of propositions, denotes a set Y containing propositions such as
‘John painted the shed on Nov. 20th, 2006’, ‘Mary painted the shed on
Nov. 20th, 2006’, and ‘Bill painted the shed on Nov. 20th, 2006’, assum-
ing the yesterday determined by the time of utterance is Nov. 20th 2006.
Since ‘Mary painted the shed on Nov. 20th, 2006’ is an element of Y but
not of X, the constraint Y ⊆ X is not satisfied, and the representation
(23) is not licensed. This is what we want.
What about substitution focus? Rooth (1992) stated a second clause
which allows the antecedent to be an element of the focus semantic value
rather than a subset of it. This is unattractive, because the definition is
disjunctive. Schwarzschild (1999) solved this problem by giving a uniform
constraint which covers alternative-set focus and substitution focus, and
also covers existential antecedents as in (22). The new constraint checks
entailment between a proposition a derived from the antecedent, and a
proposition f derived from the focus skeleton. In f , focus variables are
existentially quantified, and if the antecedent has propositional type, a
is simply the proposition denoted by the antecedent. This already covers
(22), because a is ‘Mary spoke to some person x about x’s problems’,
while f is ‘Mary spoke to some entity x about x’s problems’. Since a
entails f , the representation (22) is licensed.
In alternative-set focus, the antecedent denotes a set of propositions,
or in a functional type system, a characteristic function of a set of propo-
sitions. The corresponding type label is (st)t, where st is the type la-
bel for propositions. Schwarzschild’s axiom concerning antecedents with
functional types is that they are saturated to the type t by plugging in
existentially quantified variables for the arguments. He uses Karttunen’s
semantics for questions, where in a world w, a question denotes a set of
propositions which are true in w (Karttunen 1977). Let’s look at (24),
which is the indexed representation for (9b). In a world w, the question
denotes the characteristic function of the set of true propositions of the
form feed(Mary, y), where y is a cat in w. To existentially quantify the
argument of this characteristic function is to require that there be some
true proposition of the form feed(Mary, y), i.e., to require that Mary fed
some cat. Skipping some details related to the possible-worlds frame-
work, the result is that a is the proposition ∃y[cat(y) ∧ feed(Mary, y)].
f is the proposition ∃y[feed(Mary, y)], so a entails f .
(24) [What cats did Mary3 feed]4
[She3 [fed [Fluffy]F4]]
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We can conjecture that entailment semantics properly generalizes the
representations licensed in alternative semantics, so that specific analyses
which use alternative semantics can be ported to entailment semantics
without changing the representation of the antecedents or the indexing
relations. Some additional issues remain. Schwarzschild (1999) proposed
that the entailment constraint is applied at any non-F-marked node, not
just the maximal scope of focus as defined above. In (24) the entailment
constraint would be applied at the VP level [fed FluffyF], as well as the S
level. In such cases f is generated by existentially quantifying arguments.
In this case this produces ∃x∃y[feed(x, y)], which is entailed by the same
antecedent a. In this version of entailment semantics (which is the official
version of Schwarzschild’s givenness semantics), one should not speak of
the unique scope of a focus, but of the possibly multiple levels where
the entailment constraint is applied. These are simply the non-F-marked
phrases.
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